



THE TWO-WARS DOCTRINE AND THE REGIONAL ARMS RACE

Contradictions in U.S. Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast Asia

Jae-Jung Suh

ABSTRACT: Since the end of the cold war, the United States has been pursuing a foreign policy whose ends and means are marked by a lack of consistency. Nowhere is this more striking and dangerous than in Northeast Asia where the United States is trying to adapt to post-cold war Asia with cold war means and within a cold war mindset. In a contradictory manner, Washington is holding out the possibility of negotiations with North Korea and, at the same time, strengthening its own and its allies' military capabilities in the region. These contradictory projects impose structural constraints on Seoul's "sunshine policy" and they also undermine the fragile regional peace in Northeast Asia — a situation made more perilous in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001. If Clinton's foreign policy stood on the two legs of containment and engagement, Bush is now abandoning the latter in favor of the former. Bush's new U.S. security posture represents a bold step toward reasserting and buttressing U.S. hegemonic order in the "American lake" in the twenty-first century, hence resolving the contradictions inherent in Clinton's policy in a more dangerous manner. The article concludes that Washington and Pyongyang must acknowledge the reality of the present security dilemma, stop demonizing one another, and embrace the principle of reciprocity.

The Bush administration's new U.S. security posture, outlined in the U.S. government's 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* and fleshed out in the "counterterrorism war" after the events of 11 September 2001, represents a bold step toward reasserting and buttressing U.S. hegemonic order in the "American lake" in the twenty-first century. Yet this thrust is not a radical

departure from previous policies but rather a resolution — albeit in a more dangerous direction — of the contradiction inherent in them. Since the end of the cold war, the United States has pursued foreign policies whose ends and means are marked by a lack of consistency, as many analysts have noted.¹ Nowhere is this more striking and dangerous than in Northeast Asia where the United States is trying to adapt to post-cold war Asia with cold war means and within a cold war mindset. In a contradictory manner, Washington is talking peace with the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), two of its few leftover cold war enemies, while at the same time strengthening its own and its allies' military capabilities in the region. If these contradictory projects had, even under the more benign Clinton administration, an inherent potential to undermine not only Seoul's "sunshine policy" but also the fragile regional peace, the perilous potential is turning into a reality under the Bush administration, which favors unilateral, militaristic responses to the challenges of September 11.

U.S. policy toward Korea and Northeast Asia stands on two legs. On what we may call the engagement leg, the United States, after many decades of isolating the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), began a series of negotiations with Pyongyang in the early 1990s. American diplomats sat down with their North Korean counterparts to negotiate a peaceful end to the DPRK's nuclear program. They succeeded in reaching an agreement, the so-called Agreed Framework, that laid out a comprehensive road map for the peaceful development of the two countries' relationship. Since the agreement was signed in Geneva in 1994, the U.S. State Department has spearheaded efforts to implement the agreement on schedule, at times twisting the arms of its recalcitrant allies.² On what we may call the containment leg, however, the United States continues to pursue confrontational policies. Washington has been upgrading its own and its allies' military capabilities in the region in an effort to militarily intimidate the DPRK. Moreover the Pentagon adopted in 1993, as its post-cold war global strategy, the two "major theaters contingency" doctrine, which requires the U.S. military to be prepared to fight two simultaneous wars: in Korea and in the Middle East. As U.S. diplomats were laboring to implement the Framework, Pentagon officers were leading the drive to translate the doctrine into a reality, reconfiguring and modernizing its own and its allies' capabilities to confront the DPRK militarily. In short, the U.S. government seeks to contain and to engage the DPRK simultaneously. We may dub these contradictory elements of U.S.-DPRK policy "conengagement," an orientation that the United States replicates in its policy toward China in a less dramatic manner.

A peace regime in the real world may well grow out of this compromise between a realist power strategy and liberal institution-building. In this sense, the U.S. government may be trying to integrate two contradictory policy measures in a complex Asian security environment. Although containment and engagement may not be mutually exclusive, they can, if indiscriminately mixed, create confusion and result in counterproductive outcomes. For they may entail fundamental disagreements about strategic goals, priorities, and means. In other words, the apparent contradiction between containment and engagement may

actually embody irreconcilable social understandings of regional actors and strategic environment. And if they do, then both cannot be sustained for long. I argue that at the heart of “congruence” are irreconcilable understandings of the identities of self and other and that these have the potential of imploding America’s strategic goal of “building a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula.” As reflected in the exchanges between Washington and Pyongyang after George W. Bush’s state of the union address in 2002, the two administrations perceive each other in Manichean terms: in Washington’s eyes the DPRK is part of the “axis of evil,” while in Pyongyang’s eyes the United States represents the “empire of the devil.”

On a more immediate policy level, the containment side of U.S. policy imposes a structural constraint on the extent to which engagement can progress. Not only does it hamstring the “sunshine policy” of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Washington’s efforts at engagement, but it has also led to a regional arms buildup. In East Asia, America’s two-wars strategy has taken the form of new U.S.-led efforts to integrate and modernize U.S., ROK, and Japanese forces in preparation for a potential conflict with the DPRK. This strategy, predicated on the DPRK being “the major threat” and “the country most likely to involve the United States in a large-scale war,” lays down the force requirements that the militaries of the United States and its allies must meet. Given that the DPRK’s military capabilities have been in decline throughout the 1990s, the regional arms buildup is strategy-driven, not threat-driven. True, the “China threat” may be the actual reason for the arms buildup — with the “North Korean threat” merely a justification — but it is the “North Korean threat” that the strategy is presently designed to fight and that the United States and its allies are geared up against.

The press has extensively covered issues such as Washington’s diplomacy over Pyongyang’s nuclear program, Seoul’s engagement policy, and four-party peace talks, but they have paid much less attention to U.S. military measures. To redress this imbalance, I first examine U.S. military strategy and place it in the context of overall American policy toward the region. Only when seen from this comprehensive perspective, do the tensions and dangers inherent in the U.S. approach become clear. Next, I delineate the overall structure and implementation of the American strategy, demonstrating that its provocative nature is driving the arms buildup in the region. In the concluding section, I propose ways to formulate and implement a peace regime on the Korean peninsula.

U.S. Policies on Korea

As I have argued elsewhere, the North Korean nuclear crisis has produced in the United States two mutually incompatible strategies: the Agreed Framework and the Two Major Theaters Contingency (MTC).³ The Framework represents a roadmap for building peace in the region; the MTC strategy is a plan for waging war. Over the past several years, U.S. officials have been busy implementing these fundamentally incompatible policies as if one group is oblivious to what the other is doing. The Clinton administration tilted toward engagement and came close to diplomatically resolving most of the outstanding security issues



President Bill Clinton mixes with U.S. Army and Republic of Korea soldiers during his four-day visit to the Republic of Korea in November 1998. Clinton was given a firsthand look at a variety of armored vehicles belonging to the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division and the 5th Republic of Korea Armored Brigade while they conducted combined training at the Korean Training Center. (Dept. of Defense photo by Spc. Sharon E. Grey, U.S. Army)

with the DPRK. Had Clinton been successful, his achievement could have undermined the policy of containment. The Bush administration, which inherited Clinton's contradictory policies, leans the other way, toward containment. If his administration's policy succeeds it will undo all the achievements made by engagement efforts and sunshine policies. In this section, I will lay out the duality of U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, emphasizing the military strategy that has, despite its enormous political implications, received much less attention than diplomacy.

Agreed Framework

The 1994 Agreed Framework (<http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf>) and the negotiations it engendered have received worldwide attention. At the global level of nuclear nonproliferation, the negotiations are viewed as an important test case of the potential for positive inducements to obtain compliance from potential proliferators. At the regional level, they represent an important step toward creating a new peace regime based on a carefully crafted series of tit-for-tat measures. They constitute a milestone that specifies the mutually agreed-upon goal of moving "toward full normalization of political and economic relations" between the United States and the DPRK, two long-time adversaries who fought a war five decades ago and have remained in a state of war since that time. They represent a commitment by both sides to ending the war and replacing enmity with amity, a commitment that neither had been willing to make during the cold war period.

It is crucial at this point to note a central factor that led to the groundbreaking Agreed Framework. Washington and Pyongyang were able to produce this historic document mainly because they listened to one another and accommodated one another's concerns. DPRK leaders showed an understanding of and sensitivity to U.S. concerns about nuclear proliferation, particularly at a time when Washington was leading an international effort to renew the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pyongyang made it clear that it would never yield to what it regarded as an unfair power play, while at the same time showing a willingness to compromise. For their part, U.S. negotiators listened to their DPRK counterparts and displayed an equal flexibility in accommodating Pyongyang's primary security concerns. Pyongyang agreed to return to the NPT regime to allay America's proliferation concerns; Washington pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the DPRK, thereby alleviating Pyongyang's security worries. Pyongyang agreed to freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and eventually dismantle them to further substantiate its commitment; Washington committed itself to working to compensate the DPRK for economic loss that would result from its freeze. The two also agreed to move toward normalization of their relations as progress was made on issues of concern to each side.

In other words, their negotiations involved an element of reciprocity — an understanding of the other side's core security concerns — and this enabled both sides to come to an agreement on an issue that seemed intractable. This principle of reciprocity is what is required of all parties involved if a new regime is to be built that goes beyond the Agreed Framework to guarantee peace on the Korean peninsula. As the following discussion demonstrates, however, the United States has been engaged in unilateral moves that can undermine the foundation of reciprocity on which the Agreed Framework stands.

Win-Win Strategy and Its Regional Implementation

It is ironic that the United States adopted and passed the first budget for the two-wars strategy approximately at the same time as the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994. In the early 1990s, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Pentagon had introduced “win-hold-win” as a post-cold war strategy. This was soon replaced by the “win-win” strategy in the midst of the crisis triggered by charges about the DPRK's nuclear weapons program.⁴ The much-publicized North Korean “nuclear threat” provided the last push needed to reverse the U.S. strategy from the win-hold-win to the two-wars doctrine. The Pentagon described this new strategy as follows: “U.S. forces will be structured to achieve decisive victory in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts and to conduct combat operations characterized by rapid response and a high probability of success....Our forces must be sized and structured to preserve the flexibility and the capability to act unilaterally, should we choose to do so.”⁵

In 1994 the U.S. Congress passed a military budget (for 1995) that was designed to support the two-wars strategy. In the following years, the strategy, which remained unchanged in the 1997 and 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Reviews* under the Clinton and Bush administrations, has guided the Pentagon — and also ROK and Japanese military forces — in reconfiguring military forces in

preparation for a Korean conflict. It is ominous for the region's peace that the U.S. military has found such eager partners in South Korea and Japan as it implements its two-wars doctrine in this part of the world, whereas U.S. diplomats have found their counterparts at times dragging their feet in implementing the Agreed Framework.⁶

The 2001 *QDR*, released on 30 September 2001 after an extensive review by the Bush administration, shows a clear move toward containment in Asia. The new strategy changes little in overall U.S. combat capability as it reiterates the previous commitment to the two-wars capability, but it uses slightly different language: "U.S. forces will remain capable of swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two theaters of operation in overlapping time frames."⁷ If the force size did not change, however, the force posture is decidedly more offensive. Now U.S. forces will acquire the capability to "decisively impose our will on any one aggressor of our choosing," which includes more specifically the capability to "occupy territory or set the conditions for a regime change" in one of the two theaters in which they conduct major operations.⁸ The rollback posture, adopted as a response to the criticism leveled against the Desert Storm campaign for stopping short of forcing a regime change in Iraq, ratifies *ex post facto* the operation plan that the Combined Forces Command has kept for the Korean theater since the early 1980s. For OpPlan 5027, an application of the AirLand Battle Doctrine to Korea, specifies the steps for striking deep in North Korea from the initial stage of a war through the rollback phase. This rollback posture has taken on offensive first-strike overtones with President Bush calling on the U.S. military to "be ready for preemptive action" and with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld urging allies to take a more offensive posture.⁹

In the Asia-Pacific theater, which the Pentagon views as posing a most serious near-term threat, it sees "the potential...for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests." In the Bush administration's "new" strategic vision, however, the DPRK remains the "enormous conventional threat" that the U.S. military needs to be prepared to fight, just like in the "old" two-wars doctrine.¹⁰ Just as the 1997 *QDR* justified the then-existing force structure in terms of potential conflicts in the Middle East and Korea, so does the new *QDR* single out Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong-Il — with the addition of Osama bin Laden — as "new adversaries" who necessitate the preservation of the current U.S. force structure.¹¹ Therefore, few substantial changes can be expected in the force posture of the United States and its allies in the region, even if Washington reduces its forward military presence as a way to lighten its budgetary burden and to channel the savings to missile defense and other "Revolutions in Military Affairs" (RMAs). If the Pentagon decides to reduce its force size in the theater without modifying its published threat assessment, U.S. allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, will face pressure to shoulder more of the defense burdens.

U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific

The first Bush administration (1988-1992) produced and began implementing a three-stage plan to reduce the U.S. military presence in Korea. The first stage in the withdrawal was completed by 1991, but the Pentagon used the

North's suspected nuclear weapons development as an excuse to stop additional reductions. Furthermore, a review of the preparedness of U.S. forces in Korea at the end of 1993 argued that they were not adequate to defend against the DPRK's threat. Based on this review, the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK), General Gary Luck, requested reinforcements and the Pentagon responded with several rearmament measures. It placed under the USFK's command the Seventh Fleet, which included an aircraft carrier, and deployed a variety of weapons systems to Korea, including M1-A1 Abrams tanks, Patriot missiles, one heavy artillery division, mine sweepers, amphibious landing ships, AH-64 Apache helicopters, Bradley armored personnel carriers, and a mobile ground satellite station.¹²

A few days after the Clinton administration agreed to hold a meeting with Pyongyang in Geneva in 1994, the U.S. House of Representatives approved \$250 million in new military spending to strengthen the USFK. Two years later the United States replaced its fleet of OV-10 Mohawk surveillance aircraft with the Airborne Reconnaissance Low aircraft, equipped with advanced payloads that enhance surveillance capabilities at night and in bad weather.¹³ In 1997 the U.S. Army installed satellite communications equipment designed to speed the delivery of signals intelligence data to the USFK and ROK war-fighters.¹⁴ As if there were genuine fears about the USFK being compromised — even after these rearmament measures — President Clinton went so far as to exempt South Korea from his order to clear all active U.S. land mines when he announced support for a worldwide mine ban in 1996.¹⁵

While the USFK was being strengthened, the mobility requirement study that assessed the requirements of the two-wars doctrine in light of the Gulf War experience pointed out the need to “pre-position” military hardware in-country. The Gulf War demonstrated to U.S. military planners the enormity of the logistical tasks involved in dispatching to a regional theater personnel and hardware sizable enough to ensure a quick victory, with a minimum of U.S. casualties. Military planners proposed the pre-positioning of military hardware both at sea and in-country so that American soldiers could be rapidly transported to a theater without the logistical burden of simultaneously moving the hardware they needed. The “brigade afloat,” two armored battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions that the Army has as the core of its AWR5 pre-position capability, gives the U.S. military both in the Gulf and in Northeast Asia the capability to put ashore a potent brigade combat capability. As part of this “pre-po,” the United States shipped military hardware to the ROK in fall 1996, including tanks, armored vehicles, and communication equipment, sufficient enough for a brigade. This makes it possible to rapidly arm reinforcements in a time of need in Korea. Each year since 1994 the USFK and South Korean militaries have held an RSOI (reception, staging, onward movement, and integration into the combat force) exercise to rehearse the actions they would have to take to receive reinforcement forces, equip them with pre-positioned material, and then integrate them into combined forces. The fact that the RSOI exercises began soon after the Team Spirit exercise was canceled is an indication that the change reflected more a doctrinal shift than a transformation in U.S. policy toward Korea.¹⁶ The

implementation of the two-wars doctrine in Korea reached a high point when the U.S. Third Corps and South Korean forces staged a war game called “a joint mock combat training” in Texas in March 1996. Noting that the United States had decided in November 1995 that it would in case of an emergency airlift the U.S. First and Third Corps to Korea to double the size of the Flexible Deployment Force (FDF), one Korean-American analyst saw the war games in Texas as an enhancement of the coordination between the ROK military and the U.S. Third Corps.¹⁷

South Korean Force Modernization and U.S. Strategy

If the United States has moved somewhat cautiously to strengthen its forces in Korea, due to fiscal and domestic political considerations, the ROK has forged ahead with its ambitious military-modernization projects. Although engaged in military modernization since the 1970s, Seoul agreed in a 1994 meeting with Defense Secretary William Perry to accelerate the process. At the meeting, Seoul agreed to buy an array of sophisticated U.S. military equipment, including Apache attack helicopters and Maverick antitank missiles. A strong synergy is clear between the dictates of the Pentagon’s two-wars doctrine and the desires of the ROK’s military to strengthen itself. Washington’s strategy requires a heavy reinforcement of its allies’ military forces so that they can hold the front line until U.S. reinforcements arrive with sufficient firepower to assure a decisive victory. The force requirement that U.S. strategy dictates bodes well for the ROK’s force-modernization plan as both require high-tech, mobile forces.

Over the past three decades the ROK has built a formidable military industry that now produces a variety of ground weapons under licensed production agreements. In addition to licensed production, Korean weapons contractors are also producing indigenous armaments such as K3 machine guns, K-900 and K-2000 armored personnel carriers, and K-1 tanks, KDX destroyers, and Chang Bogo submarines.¹⁸ In the 1990s, Seoul’s force-modernization program placed increasing importance on achieving air supremacy and acquiring surveillance capability, both of which are also required by the two-wars doctrine. Seoul is projected to spend \$24 billion by 2010 on fighter jets, surveillance planes, and air defense equipment. In addition to the 120 F-16 fighters that the South’s Air Force acquired from the United States under the Korea Fighter Program, it decided in May 2002 to purchase forty F-15s under a next-generation fighter program known as the FX program.¹⁹ To strengthen its intelligence capability, the ROK is purchasing from the United States eight Hawk 800XP state-of-the-art reconnaissance planes worth a total of \$450 million. Flying 40 to 50 km south of the Military Demarcation Line, the aircraft can acquire video images of objects as small as 30 cm by 30 cm in North Korea.²⁰ With the new military intelligence-gathering systems, the ROK military will begin to acquire the capability to process real-time information on the DPRK’s military movements.²¹

The ROK government has spent 2.2 trillion won (about US\$1.9 billion) since 1992 under its “Yulgok” force-modernization project and continues to spend massive amounts to buy state-of-the-art weapons. In 1995, South Korea’s military purchases from the United States totaled \$957.4 million. In the same year, it became the world’s second-largest importer, behind China, of conventional



Members of the 434th Security Forces Squadron defend Osan Air Base, Korea, during a simulated attack by opposition forces on 25 October 1999, as part of Exercise Foal Eagle '99. (Dept. of Defense photo by Senior Airman Rick Bloom, U.S. Air Force)

weapons, spending \$1.7 billion on arms procurements. For fiscal year 1999, Seoul purchased military equipment and services worth \$4.3 billion from the United States alone, making it the biggest client for American weapons among developing countries that year.²² The ROK has budgeted \$26.5 billion for new weapons purchases in 2002, a year that is the first in a five-year force improvement program.²³ Ac-

ording to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the ROK ranked fourth among the recipients of conventional weapons during the 1996-2000 period, importing weapons worth \$5.6 billion; during the same period, the DPRK was dropped from the list of the fifteen leading arms purchasers, falling to sixty-third place.²⁴ From 1986 to 1995, the ROK maintained a high volume of imports of major conventional weapons while weapons deliveries to the DPRK fell by 98 percent.²⁵

Not satisfied that it had spent enough on arms procurements, the South Korean Defense Ministry released in July 1995 a report entitled “ROK’s Defense towards the Twenty-first Century,” which argued that an investment of a minimum of 110 trillion won (US\$145 billion [at 1995 exchange rate]) in the defense budget was “inevitable” to guarantee the South’s security for the next six years.²⁶ Although the South cut its defense budget by 3.5 percent in 1998 following the financial crisis in 1997, it intends to raise the “proportion of allocations for ‘force-improvement programmes’ — primarily for ‘import of high-cost weapons’ — ...at the expense of allocations for O&M [Operation and Management]” during the 2000-2004 period.²⁷ Moreover, on 28 June 2001, the ROK’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced a record-high \$12.72 billion defense budget for year 2002, a 6.2 percent increase from the previous year, reaffirming the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s commitment to increasing government spending on national defense.²⁸ In an ironic turn of events, while Washington was negotiating in 2000 with the DPRK to curtail its long-range missile development, the ROK succeeded in having Washington reverse its long-held policy of capping the ROK’s missile capability at 180 km to allow the development of a missile with a range up to 300 km. This expansion puts most of the DPRK within the range of ROK missiles.

After the global bifurcation of the cold war era became blurred, Seoul — which had relied exclusively on the United States for weapons imports — found an unexpected supplier of weapons systems: Russia. Moscow’s involvement

rose quickly, especially after it reached an agreement with Seoul in 1995 to settle Russia's \$1.89 billion debt with transfers of weapons systems. In 1996, Russia provided the ROK with weapons valued at \$150 million, including the first transfer of thirty upgraded T-80U tanks, thirty BMP-3 armored combat vehicles, and hundreds of IGLA portable anti-aircraft missiles and pieces of METIS-M portable antitank equipment.²⁹ Russia also agreed to deliver by the end of 2001 weapons worth \$500 million, including air-refueling planes, transport helicopters/aircraft, and other military equipment.³⁰ Formalizing the military cooperation between Moscow and Seoul, ROK defense minister Kim Dong-Jin and his Russian counterpart, Igor Rodionov, signed a military cooperation memorandum in November 1996, citing exports of weapons and military technologies as two of the most mutually beneficial areas of cooperation. The military cooperation was further reconfirmed during Russian president Vladimir Putin's visit to Seoul in 2001. If imports of Russian weapons systems constituted a large share of the ROK's military hardware, there would be grounds for worry about undermining the tight integration between the U.S. and Korean militaries, but they so far make up such a small portion that they complement the U.S.-ROK alliance and pose more complications for the DPRK than for the U.S.-ROK alliance.

After taking the Blue House in 1998, President Kim Dae-Jung initiated a policy of engagement, commonly dubbed the "sunshine policy," that led to the historic North-South summit in June 2000. The meeting was followed by a series of reunions of separated families, exchanges of cultural groups, increases in cross-border economic activities, and even a project to reconnect railroads. (The railroad project would involve clearing land mines in part of the demilitarized zone.) The ROK's defense budget also decreased in 1999 for the first time since the early 1970s, although the decrease reflected the South's economic difficulties and overall reduction of its government budget rather than a change in its military policy.³¹ (The military budget had increased at about 10 percent per year in the three decades before 1999.)

Despite the political rapprochement of the Kim Dae-Jung era and the economic hardships of the post-1997 years, however, the South has taken few meaningful measures to restrain its force modernization. On the contrary, most of its force-enhancement projects are in full development. In 2000, for example, the ROK's Ministry of National Defense allocated \$4.7 billion for research and development (R&D) and acquisition: to develop unmanned spy planes and to buy a military satellite, attack helicopters, naval destroyers, AWAC aircraft, and fighter jets. The "Medium-Term National Defense Plan," approved by President Kim in 1999, budgeted \$35 billion for weapons purchases for the next five years to develop the capability to operate outside the Korean peninsula (within 500 km from Korea), although it still will not have a "blue sea capability" even after the completion of the medium-term plan.³² On balance, military containment far outweighs political engagement even in the ROK. In 2000, for example, the ROK spent \$12.8 billion to prepare to fight the DPRK — about one hundred times as much as the \$114 million it allocated for humanitarian aid for the North Koreans who were suffering and continue to suffer a severe food shortage.³³

Japanese Integration in the U.S. War Plan

If the Pentagon's win-win strategy promotes, if not drives, the ROK's force modernization, the two-wars doctrine further accelerates the process of integrating American and Japanese forces with the USFK and ROK military, completing the circle of tripartite militarization. The smooth operation of the U.S. doctrine requires a seamless integration of U.S. and allied forces and bases in the region. That is being achieved by a number of measures: the Tokyo Security Declaration of 1996, the 1997 revision of the "Guideline," the agreement on military goods provision, joint development of such weapons systems as theater missile defense (TMD) and support fighters (F-2), and tripartite military exercises.³⁴

If Washington's "Bottom-Up-Review" formalized the win-win strategy in 1993, its application to the Asian theater was established two years later by the East Asia Strategy Review (EASR, commonly known as the Nye Initiative), which effectively reversed the first Bush administration's East Asia Strategy Initiative of 1990 (which sought to reduce the U.S. military presence in Korea and Japan). The EASR set the number of U.S. soldiers in the Asia-Pacific region at one hundred thousand and emphasized the importance of its nuclear umbrella and existing alliances. This set the stage for further implementation of the two-wars doctrine. In November 1995, Japan adopted a new National Defense Program Outline that underscored the fact that Japanese military capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the cold war. Five months later, Washington and Tokyo signed a bilateral agreement governing the provision of logistics support, military goods, and services. These measures culminated in the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (New Security Declaration) that President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto issued after their summit meeting in April 1996. The statement emphasized the centrality of their alliance to the maintenance of "a stable environment for *the Asia-Pacific region*" (emphasis added). After confirming the status quo vision contained in the EASR, Clinton and Hashimoto agreed in the declaration to review the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation for the purpose of promoting bilateral coordination in "dealing with situations that may emerge in *the areas surrounding Japan*"³⁵ (emphasis added).

The aim of promoting military cooperation outside Japan was achieved in 1997 when the Guideline itself was revised to authorize U.S.-Japan military cooperation outside Japan. The new security arrangement created by these measures represents an effort to bring U.S. forces in Japan and the Japanese government's contribution in line with the dictates of the U.S. two-wars strategy. Most significantly, the arrangement allows U.S. forces to use Japanese bases for operations outside Japan — including on the Korean peninsula — a radical departure from the previous arrangement, which precisely prohibited such an operation. It also provides the *gaiatsu* ("outside pressure") that the Japanese government needs to change its laws banning military operations outside Japan.³⁶ Citing American pressure, for example, the 2000 edition of Japan's *Defense White Paper* stated that it was "necessary to legislate a contingency law," which was drawn up in an effort to specify the steps Japan will take in the wake of armed attack in the vicinity of Japan's territory.³⁷ This step represented a

departure from the 1999 version that saw the contingency law only as “desirable.” The cooperative measures between the United States and Japan reflect the degree to which the triangular military alliance justifies Japan’s expanded military role on the Korean peninsula. Under the Bush administration’s vigorous *gaiatsu*, following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Japanese Diet passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, which allows the Japanese Self-Defense Force to be used outside “the areas surrounding Japan,” an act that was implemented in November 2001 when the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces were dispatched to the Indian Ocean. Washington’s insistence on “showing the flag” contributed to a revision of the restrictive Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Act and the removal of most of the limits on the use of force by the Self-Defense Force in peacekeeping operations overseas. As one Chinese expert on Japan has argued, while the U.S. presence in Japan might serve either as a “bottle cap” that keeps Japanese military capability in the bottle or as an “egg shell” that fosters the growth of Japanese military power, the “egg shell” function has been dominant since the mid-1990s.³⁸

If U.S. *gaiatsu* provides part of the momentum behind these measures, another contributing factor would appear to be the sea change in Japanese public opinion toward the DPRK that occurred after 1998 when Pyongyang launched what it claimed to be a satellite over Japan. Although the projectile was nothing more than a radio transmitter that broadcast revolutionary songs, the Japanese public universally perceived it to be a missile test launch. Public anxiety in Japan was exacerbated by the media’s faithful repetition of the U.S. military intelligence’s version of the event. The North Koreans named the projectile “Kwangmyongsong” (meaning “a bright star”), but it is known in Japan, as in the United States, as “Taep’odong” (meaning “great cannon”). The “Taep’odong missile test” brought home Japan’s vulnerability to a possible North Korean missile attack so acutely that the Japanese even coined the term “Taep’odong shoku” to indicate their profound sense of shock — a shock that is almost comparable to the “Nixon shoku” when Nixon visited China some three decades earlier. Combined with suspicions about the kidnapping of Japanese citizens by DPRK operatives and incidents involving “mysterious North Korean boats,” the Taep’odong shock is not only a stumbling block in political rapprochement between the two countries but also a justification for many of the measures mentioned above.

Buoyed by U.S. *gaiatsu* and the public’s sense of vulnerability, Tokyo has taken steps to improve its military capabilities. The Japanese Self-Defense Force received the Aegis air defense system for four of its Kongo-class destroyers in 1998³⁹ and decided two years later to purchase four more Aegis ships with PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3).⁴⁰ The Japanese Defense Agency, which already operates four Boeing E-767 AWACS aircraft, also plans to improve missile defense by upgrading its radar and by introducing airplane infrared detectors.⁴¹ Most significantly, Japan decided in 2000 to acquire air-refueling planes, an important step in expanding its long distance “force projection capability.”⁴² Japan’s cooperation with the United States on theater missile defense research provides another source of concern, particularly for China, which worries that

the TMD would reduce China's ability to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence.

The trilateral military cooperation, whose foundation consists of shared doctrines and common hardware, is being perfected through bilateral exercises (U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan) that overlap so that all three countries have an opportunity to practice coordination. The "Team Spirit" exercise, which North Korea had long denounced as a test nuclear war exercise against them, stopped in 1994, creating an atmosphere that was conducive to dialogue with Pyongyang. Since that time, however, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have staged a number of other military exercises. The one that best demonstrates trilateral military cooperation is "Keen Sword," between the United States and Japan; this exercise is held nearly at the same time as "Foal Eagle," between the United States and South Korea. In Foal Eagle, troops from the U.S. 2nd Army Division are transported from the U.S. mainland to Korea, while American soldiers stationed in Japan take part in Keen Sword with Japan's ground, maritime, and air Self-Defense Forces. In the 1997 exercise, the Japanese Self-Defense Force deployed 130 aircraft and 11 warships while the U.S. Forces in Japan mobilized 170 aircraft and 6 warships, including the aircraft carrier USS *Independence*. The 1997 exercise marked the first time that a U.S. aircraft carrier was used in a joint drill with Japan in the Sea of Japan, demonstrating the extent to which U.S. and Japanese forces had integrated to implement the two-wars strategy in the Northeast region. It should also be noted that during the 1997 exercises, the United States and Japan carried out their first practice in providing each other with military goods and services, a procedure provided by the logistics support agreement reached in April 1996. In November 2000, the United States also conducted a joint military exercise with Japan to enhance its cooperation with Japan's Self-Defense Forces in the event of a military contingency in areas surrounding Japan.⁴³

Duality of U.S. Approach to Peace

In sum, the United States is using classic cold war methods to contain the DPRK while it is also engaged in negotiations to ease tensions and to terminate Pyongyang's nuclear development program. As part of its worldwide effort to limit weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, Washington remains the chief player in the international consortium to implement the Agreed Framework and is continuing its various dialogues with Pyongyang. Even the current Bush administration, which avowedly harbors "no trust in the North Korean leadership," has reaffirmed its willingness to negotiate with the DPRK.⁴⁴ At the same time, however, the United States is pursuing its two-wars doctrine by accelerating the modernization and integration of allied militaries in the region and by producing and propagating the mantra that the DPRK is a threat to be fought, not a partner to engage in dialogue.

The contradictory nature of U.S. policies is brought into stark relief when the allied regional arms buildup is juxtaposed with the DPRK's declining economic and military capabilities. Even ROK government statistics show that the ROK's military spending surpassed the DPRK's by 20 percent in 1985, an advantage the

ROK subsequently increased to a ten to one ratio by year 2000.⁴⁵ As early as 1987, Stephen Goose had suggested that the ROK's military capability was not inferior to the DPRK's, a view repeated by many⁴⁶ and recognized even by the ROK's military in 1990.⁴⁷ By the mid-1990s, many suspected that "the South's conventional military strength [was]...superior to the North's," as one daily newspaper editorial stated.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the United States is allocating nearly one-third of its defense spending to the Asia-Pacific region, where the DPRK has been designated the chief threat, and enlisting Japanese support for its endeavor as well.

To understand why the United States is pursuing the two-wars doctrine and regional militarization despite its apparent overwhelming military superiority, it may be necessary to situate the doctrine in a wider regional context that takes into account the tenuous Sino-U.S. relationship. The high levels of weapons sales, military exercises, and military budgets, all of which are justified by the need to fight the "North Korean threat," may actually contribute to the persistence of the "threat." Situating the material capability in the context of a social reality constituted by discursive politics gives us a better understanding of how the Pentagon has been able to sell its Asian strategy under the cover of a "North Korean threat." As the United States implements its doctrine, it has produced a stream of analyses and reports that single out the Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf as the world's most dangerous and strategically important places. According to George Tenet, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "[a] Korean war scenario remains our primary near-term military concern," a view that National Defense University reinforced in its annual report on national security threats. The security concern is justified in a number of ways. At the height of the famine in the DPRK in 1997, Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), pointed out that the combination of the North's economic crisis and its military power posed the greatest immediate security concern for the United States. By 2000, when its economic crisis seemed to have bottomed out, however, Tenet said that "the North Korean military appears, for now, to have halted its near decade-long slide in military capabilities" and that "we have not yet seen a significant diminution of the threat from the North to American and South Korean interests." In other words, the DPRK is perceived to be a threat no matter what its material condition is.

Concerns about the DPRK's conventional military capabilities are furthered by worries about its missiles. One of President Bush's three overarching military goals is "to develop the capabilities to defend against missiles." The rationale for this position comes from the Rumsfeld Commission's report on missile threat. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, headed by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, concluded in its report to the U.S. Congress in 1998 that "[North Korea, Iran, and Iraq] would be able to inflict major destruction on the [United States] within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability."⁴⁹ No sooner was this report released than the DPRK fired its Kwangmyongsong projectile over Japan, fanning the flames of fear. Fears about the DPRK's long-range missiles are heightened by similar concerns

about its shorter-range missiles, as reflected in George Tenet's statement in February 2001 before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee on Worldwide Threats to National Security: "We continue to face ballistic missile threats from a variety of actors beyond Russia and China, specifically North Korea."

The way in which the United States understands the situation in Northeast Asia is well captured in Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's report on the Korean situation in 2000:

North Korea remains the major threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia and is the country most likely to involve the United States in a large-scale war. While the historic summit between the North and South leaders holds the promise of reconciliation and change, no evidence exists of the fundamental precursors for change. There is little or no evidence of economic reform or reform-minded leaders; reduction in military forces; or a lessening of anti-US rhetoric. A decade of steep economic decline has not deterred the North's leaders from allocating precious resources to improving their military forces. The DPRK maintains a dogged adherence to a "military first" policy even against the backdrop of a nation facing severe economic and social challenges.⁵⁰

Thus the DPRK's missiles and conventional forces are framed in terms of an offensive capability that can inflict major damage on the United States. Excluded from the framing is an alternative, and more plausible, possibility: the DPRK is providing for its security in the face of the overwhelming power of its adversary. The logic of the security dilemma suggests that just as the DPRK's military represents a security threat to the United States and its allies, so do the forces of the



President George W. Bush speaks to American forces and their families during his visit to Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, on 21 February 2002. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Johnny Saldivar, USAF. American Forces Press Service)

United States, the ROK, and Japan threaten the DPRK. Such a simple understanding, however, is out of the question for the likes of Tenet and Rumsfeld because the vicious cycle of insecurity is embedded in fifty years of confrontational interaction, making the enmity seem part of the natural order of things. Viewed from either side of the confrontation, the enmity seems to derive directly and immediately from the “anarchic” nature of the international system, and the threat from the “essentially” hostile nature of the other party. Neither party is capable of rising above the enmity; neither is able to see itself and its adversary caught in the security dilemma that they themselves have produced.

Unable, or even unwilling, to recognize the security dilemma, the Bush administration is making unilateral efforts to secure the United States from what it mistakenly perceives to be the unilateral threat posed by the DPRK. Bush’s national security team is on the one hand engaged in the nonproliferation activities that aim to freeze the DPRK’s capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction while on the other hand pursuing the counterproliferation programs that seek to preemptively destroy the DPRK’s potential threats. Nonproliferation is indeed a praiseworthy goal, but U.S. efforts to reach this goal are being undermined by the contradiction inherent in Washington’s nonproliferation policy. For while Washington is preaching to the world about the dangers of nuclear weapons, it is at the same time perpetuating the discourse that America’s nuclear weapons protect peace. Washington argues that the acquisition of a new nuclear weapon by nonnuclear states would pose an immense threat to humanity, yet at the same time it is protecting the overkill capacity of its own nuclear arsenal. The United States keeps its own nuclear materials beyond international inspections and control, while it insists on intrusive inspections of nuclear installations elsewhere. Nowhere is America’s contradictory position more apparent than in Korea. On the Korean peninsula, Washington’s duality has led to the self-contradictory position that it guarantees, under the Agreed Framework, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea while at the same time maintaining, under its Defense Treaty with South Korea, a nuclear umbrella over the South, threatening nuclear retaliation against the North.

Furthermore, Washington’s contradictory nonproliferation policy is combined with its offensive counterproliferation measures. While maintaining the overwhelming superiority of its mass-destruction power, the U.S. military is, under Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, forging ahead with its “Revolutions in Military Affairs” to develop next-generation weapons such as missile defense systems and a new nuclear weapon to destroy Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBT).⁵¹ The United States is simultaneously the leading advocate of nuclear deterrence and the leader in the development of precision-guided weapons. The new focus in America’s weapons development strategy, coupled with efforts to curb worldwide proliferation, smacks of the duplicity of SALT I in the early 1970s. Although SALT I was ostensibly intended to limit the increase in the number of missiles, the agreement was criticized by some for providing a cover under which a new generation of nuclear armaments could be developed, particularly multiple-independent-reentry-vehicles (MIRVs). U.S. weapons production is moving toward next-generation weapons systems, i.e., so-called smart

bombs, missile defense systems, and new types of nuclear weapons, while other countries, including China and the DPRK, are still grappling with such early cold war technologies as ballistic missiles. The United States is trying to freeze weapons development in the rest of the world at the current, primitive level of precision just as it continues to develop more precise and effective weapons systems of its own. Again, nowhere is America's contradictory position more apparent than in Korea. The United States remains the unrivaled number one supplier of missiles and other state-of-the-art weapons systems to Seoul; at the same time it is leading international efforts to have Pyongyang terminate its missile exports. Washington is vigorously pursuing its missile defense programs and accelerating its Revolution in Military Affairs; at the same time it is leading the international charge against Pyongyang's programs of outdated weapons.

This is not to suggest that it is meaningless for Washington to try to control the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; my point is rather that U.S. efforts will be less effective as long as Washington is engaged in contradictory policies, for others will view American nonproliferation initiatives with skepticism and will want to match its weapons programs with their own weapons programs. If the United States wants to eradicate the temptation of smaller, poorer countries to develop weapons of mass destruction, it must lead an international effort to scrap the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and nuclear attack. It is clear that many countries —North Korea among them — are inclined to develop weapons of mass destruction because they fear U.S. nuclear weapons.⁵² If Washington wishes to prevent proliferation of high-tech weapons and their technology, it must lead an international effort to curb arms exports, including its own. The Korean peninsula would be an excellent testing ground for a policy genuinely geared toward peace — a policy that rests on curtailing rather than stoking the arms race. The United States must squarely face the dilemma that arises from its reluctance to envision a fundamentally different concept of peace and security: it must come to terms with the imperative that its nonproliferation efforts must be coupled with restraints on itself.⁵³ The Bush administration, however, is moving in the opposite, more precarious, direction to resolve the contradiction by withdrawing from an arms control treaty, developing new weapons systems, adopting an offensive military strategy, and supporting proliferators.

Designing a Peace Regime

Nuclear proliferation concerns drove the Clinton administration to the negotiating table at which the Agreed Framework was signed. But the potential for nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula will linger as long as Korea remains a dangerous powder keg with a short fuse. In order for a nonproliferation regime on the peninsula to be effective and robust, it needs to be complemented by a mechanism that will reduce the conventional military threat felt on both sides of the demilitarized zone. This requires, at a minimum, ending the Korean War, which the Armistice Agreement only suspended in 1953. To ensure nonproliferation and allay security concerns, both the ROK and the DPRK must radically disarm with the support of Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. To defuse

the Korean powder keg, Korea has to be peacefully reunified, and it has to be reunified in a form that will not upset the power balance among the four powers. In the next section, I examine some issues that stand in the way of reaching these goals.

As argued above, a key to the Agreed Framework's success lay in Washington's and Pyongyang's willingness to recognize the other side's core concerns and address them on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. The Bush and Kim Jong-Il governments honored at least some terms of the Framework until the end of 2002, but they now have to deal with the almost certain outcome that one of its key components, the construction of two light-water reactors, will not be completed by the agreed-upon target date of 2003. The reactor construction is so central to the Framework that failure to complete it would certainly cast doubt on the sustainability and utility of the Framework. And it is quite likely to lead to the collapse of the Agreed Framework itself. To avoid the collapse, the two governments must immediately begin negotiations. However, they have refused to meet and instead appear to be gearing up for a confrontation by putting forth conflicting demands. Insisting that the North Korean officials admitted at a meeting with Assistant Secretary James Kelly to having a nuclear weapons program, the Bush administration now insists that the DPRK immediately and verifiably dismantle it as a precondition for the resumption of diplomatic negotiations.⁵⁴ (The DPRK denies this allegation, insisting it said only that it is "entitled to possess" nuclear weapons systems.)

On its side, the Kim Jong-Il government has demanded that the United States compensate it for the economic loss that will result from the delay in the construction of the two reactors and that the United States sign a nonaggression treaty. The Kim Dae-Jung government of South Korea tried to mediate between the two by proposing to supply its electricity to the DPRK as compensation or by sending a special envoy to Pyongyang, but failed to bridge the gap between Washington and Pyongyang. The two will be able to get out of the stalemate only when they are willing to move away from a Manichean view of the other and return to the principle of reciprocity. This process may be facilitated by relatively easy and tangible steps similar to the Kumchangri "inspection": as a way to address U.S. concerns, Pyongyang invites U.S. officials to "visit" some of its facilities that are suspected of nuclear activities; as a way to reassure its willingness to honor the Agreed Framework, the Bush administration, in turn, commits itself to completing the construction of the two reactors by a mutually agreed date.

The nuclear stalemate is further complicated by a clash over missile issues. If President Clinton made it clear that he would link progress in missile negotiations to lifting economic sanctions against the DPRK and improving relations between Pyongyang and Washington, President Bush has made this one of the cornerstones of his policies toward the DPRK. Any substantial progress in the peace talks and any normalization of North Korean diplomatic and economic relations with the West, therefore, depends on the two parties achieving a constructive compromise on the missile issues. In Berlin in 1996 President Clinton began a series of negotiations on missile issues, and in September 1999 Kim Jong-Il agreed to a moratorium on missile testing while the negotiations were

still under way. Kim has since repeatedly confirmed his willingness to maintain the moratorium until 2003. Clinton appeared to be on the verge of making a breakthrough just before he left office in January 2001: he and Kim Jong-Il exchanged envoys at the highest level to arrange a summit where they would seal an agreement to shut down the North Korean missile program.⁵⁵ At present, Bush and Kim are at a stalemate. Bush wants to prevent the development and export of missiles by the North while Kim insists that the development and deployment of missiles in the DPRK is a matter of its sovereign right to self-defense.⁵⁶

The fundamental difference between Clinton's near-success and Bush's stalemate lies not in Bush's unwillingness to talk nor in his proposal to expand the agenda for talks but in his refusal to end the enmity between the two nations. The most recent U.S.-North Korea joint statement, issued in October 2000, shows that it was precisely because the two governments made a commitment to end hostile policies toward each other that the North was ready to scrap its missile program:

Recognizing that improving ties is a natural goal in relations among states and that better relations would benefit both nations in the twenty-first century while helping ensure peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. and the D.P.R.K. sides stated that they are prepared to undertake a new direction in their relations. As a crucial first step, the two sides stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity.

Building on the principles laid out in the June 11, 1993 U.S.-D.P.R.K. Joint Statement and reaffirmed in the October 21, 1994 Agreed Framework, the two sides agreed to work to remove mistrust, build mutual confidence, and maintain an atmosphere in which they can deal constructively with issues of central concern. In this regard, the two sides reaffirmed that their relations should be based on the principles of respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.⁵⁷

It is precisely this commitment "to build a new relationship free from past enmity" that is required to peacefully defuse the missile issue. Pyongyang is not likely to give up the production and deployment of missiles unless Washington shows a willingness to address its security concerns. Hence a solution might lie in a set of reciprocal concessions whereby Bush provides a security guarantee in exchange for Pyongyang's termination of its missile program. Only when Bush comes to the realization that his nonproliferation policy is riddled with contradictions and that the U.S.-North Korea relationship is entrenched in a security dilemma will such a solution become possible. Given the DPRK's severe economic problems, one might be tempted to think that it will give in to U.S. pressure only if Washington offers economic incentives such as the removal of sanctions. But this may well prove to be wishful thinking because Pyongyang is likely to argue that its military capabilities and missiles are the only guarantor of its survival. To treat what it considers to be a life-or-death issue as an economic

bargaining chip is to put the cart before the horse. Such an approach ignores the stubborn reality that the DPRK's missiles are a by-product of the enmity between the two nations and that a solution to the missile issue can begin only with a reciprocal recognition that both sides of the DMZ share the common responsibility for the persistent military tension and arms buildup. Without this sense of reciprocity, hawks in the United States and South Korea, as well as in North Korea, may find many a chance to halt and reverse the peace process and to maintain the military status quo.

In addition to its growing ballistic missile capabilities, North Korea's forward deployment of its infantry units and artillery forces near the DMZ represents a major source of concern for the United States and the ROK. According to ROK and U.S. military estimates, between 55 percent and two-thirds of North Korea's 1.1 million military personnel are deployed within 100 km of the DMZ.⁵⁸ The DPRK's conventional force (1 million) is buttressed by greatly improved special forces that number one hundred thousand. The special forces are trained to filter rapidly into key political, industrial, and other sectors within the South. Most statistics on military balance show that the DPRK maintains a quantitative advantage in the number of soldiers and various weapons systems whereas the South has a qualitative edge in its weapons and training. Accurately comparing the military capabilities of the two is an extremely complicated task. Force comparisons may be difficult to make but the logic of the security dilemma is easy to see. Just as the United States and the ROK are concerned about the DPRK's force deployment near the DMZ, so Pyongyang is equally concerned that 90 percent of ROK and USFK personnel are positioned within 50 km of the DMZ.⁵⁹ Each side claims that its forces are defensive and those of the other side are offensive; each justifies its force posture on the basis of a perceived threat from the other's force posture. Now is the time for both sides to acknowledge that they are entrapped in a vicious security dilemma. That acknowledgement would constitute the first step out of the dilemma. For just as the security dilemma is a by-product of practices of enmity that Washington and Pyongyang have long been engaged in, so does its resolution begin with practices that replace enmity with amity. If either Pyongyang or Washington argues that its forces are purely defensive, then it should be prepared to accept the other side's claim that its forces are also defensive. Given Seoul's growing military superiority over Pyongyang, by the same token, the ROK should be prepared to scrap its plans for weapons purchases and force modernization in exchange for the DPRK's halting its missile programs and limiting its arms purchases. The United States, the major weapons supplier to the ROK, should also be prepared to support Seoul's decision to stop arms imports and to stop reinforcement of the USFK in exchange for Pyongyang's pledge not to export or import weapons. Once arms limitation is agreed upon and implemented, the two Koreas can start the process of building down their arms stockpiles.

Some of these steps were taken or at least were in the works during the Clinton administration. The Agreed Framework of 1994 laid down the political framework that would allay in a step-by-step, reciprocal manner America's concerns about the DPRK's nuclear program and Pyongyang's concerns about the

U.S. military posture. The Clinton administration was apparently on the verge of negotiating away the missile problem in its final days precisely because it acknowledged the security dilemma dynamic on the Korean peninsula, as clearly reflected in Defense Secretary Perry's admission that the North's missiles might be a weapon of deterrence: "[North Korean missiles'] primary reason... is deterrence.... They would be deterring the United States."⁶⁰ On the basis of this acknowledgement, the Clinton administration moved to give North Korea a guarantee of no nuclear threat and political normalization; the Kim Jong-Il government reciprocated by freezing its nuclear and missile programs. The Bush administration halted these processes, allegedly for a review, and has thus far stubbornly refused to acknowledge that the United States and the DPRK are entrapped in a vicious cycle. Instead, it prefers to demonize the DPRK and to take unilateral measures. The Bush administration's insistence on taking unilateral steps — rather than adopting reciprocal measures — goes directly against the premises underlying the Agreed Framework and other joint statements, and could well undo the achievements made through negotiations.

Pyongyang has long demanded the replacement of the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty with the United States and the normalization of relations between the two, but in recent years it has shown an interest in what it calls "a nonaggression treaty" in lieu of a peace treaty. The DPRK has even indicated its willingness to consider dropping its long-standing demand that the U.S. military withdraw from South Korea. After the historic summit in 2000, Kim Dae-Jung revealed that Kim Jong-Il expressed his "understanding" that the U.S. military might remain on the Korean peninsula even after reunification. Washington, however, regards the Korean armistice as the cornerstone of the U.S. alliance system in Northeast Asia and as therefore untouchable. It is "virtually heresy even to raise the issue, let alone discuss a detailed road plan toward ending the armistice," as two insightful observers have noted.⁶¹ One way to resolve the differences might lie in a set of simultaneous nonaggression pacts between the parties to the Korean War that would establish a new, truly peacekeeping function for UN forces.

Who is to be party to the resolution of the unresolved war is a tricky question, and answers to the question vary.⁶² Washington and Pyongyang are certainly parties, but there is little agreement on Seoul's and Beijing's status. Although China as one of the three signatories is still a *de jure* party to the armistice, I argue that China is not a *de facto* party because the *de facto* state of war that had existed between China and the United States and South Korea ended when Beijing opened diplomatic relations with both. Also, despite Pyongyang's insistence that Seoul is not a party, I argue that Seoul's *de facto*, if not *de jure*, status has to be reckoned with. A peace regime on the Korean peninsula cannot be built if the South is not involved as a full party. Acknowledging China's and ROK's *de facto* and *de jure* status, Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang should adopt a document that would lay out a comprehensive set of measures, perhaps in a form similar to the Agreed Framework, that each commits itself to taking in order to end the state of war. Seoul and Pyongyang have already made progress on this front: they signed a nonaggression pact in 1991 and held a summit in

2000. It is now up to Pyongyang and Washington to take meaningful measures to end the state of war.

On a regional level, Washington needs to recognize that Beijing and Moscow would find intolerable the idea of a reunified Korea in which the United States remains the sole foreign military presence, just as it would be unfathomable for Washington or Tokyo to accept a reunified Korea under Chinese or Russian influence. All four powers have a vital stake in peace on the peninsula, but they all prefer a divided Korea under no one's control over a unified Korea under the lopsided influence of one of the four. The international system in Northeast Asia, in other words, has an interest in maintaining the status quo even at the cost of continued instability and the risk of conflagration. Furthermore, the United States, Russia, China, and, to a lesser degree, Japan, remain the major sources of weapons and related technology for the two Koreas, giving these nations further incentive to perpetuate the fragile division. A peace regime on the peninsula, therefore, needs an international component that would constrain arms transfers from the four and alleviate the concerns that each might have over upsetting the power balance on the Korean peninsula.

A regional factor that could adversely affect the peace process on the Korean peninsula is the ever-increasing emphasis on military preparedness and joint arms buildup among the three countries under the leadership of the United States. This in itself promotes a vicious power-political rivalry, if not an arms race, between Japan and China, which may negatively affect the relationship between China and the United States and the peace process on the Korean peninsula. First, it intensifies the military pressure on the DPRK and increases its isolation, thus hampering the process of military confidence-building and arms control. The stepped-up military cooperation between the United States and Japan codifies the triangular military alliance that justifies Japan's military role on the Korean peninsula. In the eyes of the North Koreans, in particular, this development exacerbates militarization of the Korean peninsula, as well as providing powerful evidence of a reemerging Japanese militarism in the region. Hence a peace regime needs to be buttressed by a regional framework that would neutralize adverse international factors over which the Korean people have no control.

Second, growing militarization of the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan could negatively affect peace-building efforts on the Korean peninsula by heightening China's and Russia's security concerns. When Winston Lord, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, was asked in April 1996 if he expected a positive reaction from Beijing to the joint security declaration in Tokyo, he replied that "the U.S. is confident that Beijing should have every reason to welcome a reaffirmation of our alliance. It is not directed at any one country, and Beijing, I think, understands that close U.S.-Japan relations make for stability and predictability in the region."⁶³ In fact, however, Beijing and Moscow reacted by developing a bilateral "strategic partnership" during a summit meeting immediately after the announcement of the U.S.-Japan joint security declaration. Evidently fearful that the development of the U.S.-led tripartite military alliance was another form of American hegemony, Russia and China

formally signed a treaty of “friendship and cooperation” on 16 July 2001. This historic treaty opposes U.S. missile defense and solidifies Russian support for China’s sovereign right over Taiwan.⁶⁴ In response to U.S. unilateralism, Russia and China have in recent years held a series of summits and high-level visits and have issued regular joint declarations expressing their opposition to “unilateral use of force.”⁶⁵

The peace process among the three parties needs to be complemented by a regional regime because arms control and disarmament require a wider participation of the regional states, including China, Russia, and Japan. The involvement of all three is essential for a Northeast Asia-wide regime of restraints in arms transfers to the Korean peninsula and for a regional agreement to make the peninsula a nuclear weapons-free zone. An excellent way to work on this regional regime is to build on the nonnuclear declaration that the DPRK and ROK signed in 1991, pledging not to develop nuclear weapons. The four major powers have yet to express any respect or support for this pledge. In order to make the declaration more effective, North and South Korea could add a protocol, which the four powers would then sign and ratify, that would pave the way toward a more ambitious demilitarization system that would prohibit the transfer weapons or weapons-related technology to, or through, either Korea.⁶⁶

If the peace process is intensified through the mechanisms described above, the two Koreas may reach a qualitatively higher level of inter-Korean dialogue. This, in turn, may produce a political commonwealth, possibly a confederal or federal form of political integration, between the two Koreas. At this juncture, the multilateral peace talks, which began as a specific forum for peace on the Korean peninsula, could develop into a region-wide security forum for Northeast Asia. The formation of a loose political commonwealth on the peninsula will be an indication that a mature and stable peace regime has emerged in Korea. At this stage, the focus of the multilateral forum for Korea would be able to shift to the higher level of a peace mission for East Asia. For example, the nonnuclear declaration signed by the two Koreas and endorsed by the four surrounding powers could serve as a basis for building a regional nuclear weapons-free zone that would include not only the Korean peninsula but also Japan. The multilateral regional forum could perhaps start addressing regional security issues such as the potential arms race in Northeast Asia. As it expands its scope, it may develop into a multilateral common security organization similar to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Conclusion: Out of a Security Dilemma to Reciprocity

In his seminal work, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, E. H. Carr illuminates a dialectical way in which realism and idealism interact.⁶⁷ Realism, he explains, favors facts and analysis over purpose: “[Realism] emphasizes the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and insists that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to, these forces and tendencies.” Carr warns that this type of realism, though at times needed as a corrective to the excesses of utopianism, might result in “the sterilization of thought and the negation of action.” He admits that there is also

a period when “utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism.” Thought without analysis is utopian; but thought without purpose is barren. In a final dialectical synthesis, therefore, Carr proposes that mature thought combines purpose with observation and analysis: “Utopia and reality are thus the two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place.”⁶⁸

How do we find a place for reality and utopia in designing a course toward a peace regime on the Korean peninsula? A beginning lies in envisioning a creative synthesis of brute power politics and liberal institution-building, a step that is critically contingent on rising above the antagonistic self-other divide to imagine the other in a nonantagonistic way. In Northeast Asia, a simple acceptance of power politics provides no guarantee of peace, as I have argued. Tripartite militarization (by the United States, South Korea, and Japan) will only precipitate negative reactions from North Korea, China, and Russia, intensifying the already tense environment of the region, and possibly triggering an arms race and even a war. As long as the United States, South Korea, and Japan pursue the realist power strategy of strengthening and integrating their military alliances, the international system in the region will continue to be tense. At the same time, South Korea and Japan may become prisoners of their complacency, unable to develop their own vision of a new regional order — one that would slow the arms race and promote a peaceful interaction among the nations of Northeast Asia. This vicious cycle was first broken by the Agreed Framework in which each side to the confrontation not only recognized its adversary’s security concerns but also took measures to allay them. Further progress was made when Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Il held a summit in 2000, moving the two Koreas closer to amity. The final step in the peace offensive was to be Clinton’s own summit meeting with the North Korean leader. Clinton’s contradiction-ridden “congame” policy was taking a decisive turn toward engagement, but the Bush administration has succeeded in changing course. The 2001 *QDR* has stifled any debate within the Bush administration by reasserting the two-wars strategy. Thus, the proponents of containment have gained an almost irreversible momentum and mortally crippled those who favor engagement, which will only exacerbate the tension that Clinton’s “old” two-wars strategy had created.

To resolve the missile issue and to build peace in the region, a new security framework is needed — one that emphasizes less the centrality of power politics and more the importance of multilateral interactions among countries in Northeast Asia. A balance must be struck between alliance politics and multilateral peace endeavors. Continued arms transfers from the United States to South Korea, the accelerating arms buildup by South Korea, and joint efforts in arms production — particularly of ballistic missile defense systems — by Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo make any peace proposal a hollow gesture. An initiative for peace talks must be coupled with a blueprint for reducing the centrality of military transactions within the military alliances. To acknowledge the reality of the present security dilemma and the necessity for reciprocity is the first step toward peace in Northeast Asia.

Notes

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1. See, for example, Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (winter 1996/97): 5-53; Richard Haas, "Paradigm Lost," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (January/February 1995): 45-55; and Sheldon W. Simon, "Alternative Visions of Security in the Asia Pacific," *Pacific Affairs* 69 (fall 1996): 381-96.
2. While the Clinton administration advocated upholding the Agreed Framework, South Korea's Kim Young-Sam's government was reluctant to go along with the U.S. measures; now the Bush administration is half-hearted about the agreement while the Kim Dae-Jung government has insisted on dialogue and exchanges. Despite its initial dismissal of negotiations with the DPRK, however, the Bush administration recently announced its willingness to open talks with the North. The main issues on the negotiating table will be the implementation part of the Agreed Framework, the verification of North Korean ballistic missile development, and conventional arms reduction. See "U.S. Plans to Reopen Missile Talks with Korea," *The Washington Post*, 8 June 2001, A15.
3. Jae-Jung Suh, "North Korean 'Nuclear Threat' and Cold War Hangover: Northern Exposure or Explosion?" *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 28, no. 1 (1996): 13-26.
4. The two strategies postulate the United States being engaged in two regional wars almost simultaneously. In the win-hold-win formula, the U.S. military will fight one of the regional wars to victory while holding the other war; after a victory on the first front, it will concentrate its forces on the second. In the win-win strategy, however, the "hold" part is left out, requiring the U.S. military to fight the two wars at the same time with equal force.
5. *Report on the Bottom-Up Review*, U.S. Department of Defense, October 1993.
6. With Kim Dae-Jung in the Blue House and George W. Bush in the White House, the situation was reversed. The South Korean government desired the continuation of the engagement policy, but the U.S. administration was not keen on it.
7. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, U.S. Department of Defense, 30 September 2001, 21.
8. The first quote in the sentence is from Paul Wolfowitz, "Building a Military for the Twenty-first Century," prepared testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 4 October 2001, 11; the second is from the 2001 *QDR*, 21.
9. George W. Bush, graduation speech at West Point, 1 June 2002: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html> (accessed on 2 June 2002). In his trip to NATO headquarters in June 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld pressed NATO allies to take a more offensive posture and stressed the need to "recalibrate the definition of defensive." See his remarks at a NATO press conference on 6 June 2002: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/t06062002_t0606sd.html (accessed on 7 June 2002).
10. "Paul Wolfowitz Discusses the Pentagon's Funding Problems," CNN, Evans, Novak, Hunt, and Shields, transcript no. 072800CN.V38, 28 July 2001. (Document retrieved via Lexis on 7 August 2001.)

11. *Ibid.*, 5. According to a *New York Times* report, a classified war game conducted by the Pentagon — “Positive Match” — determined that the U.S. military, with the current level of troops and weapons, “could decisively defeat one potential adversary, North Korea, while repelling an attack from Iraq.” See Thomas Shanker, “Secret War Game Eases Concerns over Readiness,” *The New York Times*, 7 September 2001, A12.
12. “U.S. Brings Advanced Main Battle Tanks to S. Korea,” *Reuters North American Wire*, 12 May 1995.
13. The plane can also monitor the movement of enemy ground troops and report their location in real time. Michael Sperting, “Spy Aircraft Will Assist U.S. Troops in S. Korea,” *Defense News*, 29 April-5 May 1996, 2.
14. Only a small number of American allies, including Canada and Great Britain, but not Israel, have access to U.S. satellite data. “U.S. Army Seeks SATCOM to Speed Korean SIGINT,” *Journal of Electronic Defense*, April 1996. Cited in *Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules*, 4 April 1996.
15. William Neikirk, “In Bid for International Pact, U.S. Will Remove Weapons by 1999 Except in Korea; Clinton Urges Immediate Ban on Land Mines,” *The Chicago Tribune*, 17 May 1996.
16. Although Team Spirit has not been staged since 1994, there have been other military exercises. The “Ulchi-Focus Lens” (UFL) — a command post exercise that resulted from combining two separate exercises, Ulchi and Focus Lens — has been staged every year since its inception in 1994.
 On the South Korean side, the 12-day-long UFL is attended by administrative officers at the county and district levels and above as well as military units of army corps, naval fleet, and air force of the wing-class and above; on the U.S. side, the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and subordinate units of the Eighth U.S. Army command participate in the exercise. By contrast, the “Hoguk” exercise, which is staged annually from March to April, involves only personnel from South Korea’s army, navy, and air force. Involving two corps deployed near the DMZ, “Hoguk 96” was the largest military drill since the Korean War. “U.S., S. Korea to Hold Joint Military Exercise,” *Japan Economic Newswire*, 15 April 1995.
17. Han Ho-Sok, “Pyonghwa hoedam jeankwa kunpijungkangui mosun” (The contradiction between the peace talk proposal and increasing militarization), *Center for Korean Affairs*, <http://onekorea.org/> (1996).
18. Kwang-Il Baek, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Chung-in Moon, *The Dilemma of Third World Defense Industries: Supplier Control or Recipient Autonomy?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 160-61.
19. Caving in to intense U.S. pressure, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense chose Boeing’s F-15 as its next-generation fighter even though France’s Rafal fighter scored higher in performance evaluations. Despite opposition to the deal from its own air force and civil society, the ministry opted for the U.S. aircraft amidst charges of corruption and political favoritism. Lee Soo-Jeong, “Dassault to Decline S. Korean Bids,” *The Associated Press*, 5 June 2002; Lee Soo-Jeong, “Boeing Signs \$4.5b Contract with Korea,” *The Associated Press*, 19 April 2002; and Katherine Bruce, “Fighter Jet Makers Compete at Seoul Air Show,” *The Reuter Asia-Pacific Business Report*, 21 October 1996.
20. Although the deal was temporarily suspended in 1998 due to corruption charges, the delivery of eight RH-800XPs was scheduled to be completed in 2001. See *SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute/Oxford University Press, 2000), 404.
21. “Defense Ministry to Purchase Military Reconnaissance Planes from USA,” *Yonhap News Agency*, 29 June 1996.

22. "Database on U.S. Arms Transfers from FY 1990-2000," The Federation of American Scientists, Arms Sales Monitoring Project, http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/sales_db.htm (accessed on 18 July 2002).
23. Darren Lake, "South Korea Announces Record High Budget," *Janes' Defense Weekly*, 4 July 2001, 3.
24. Bjorn Hagelin et al., "The Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons: By Recipients and Supplies, 1996-2000, SIPRI Yearbook 2001 Project. For details, see <http://projects.sipri.se/armstrade/apx5a.pdf> (accessed on 21 July 2001).
25. *SIPRI Yearbook 1996* (New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute/Oxford University Press, 1996), 466; "'Hangyore Shinmun' Questions Quantity of Weapons Imported from USA," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 29 May 1995; and Barbara Starr, "North Korea Redeploys Aircraft Closer to DMZ," *Janes' Defense Weekly*, 3 April 1996.
26. "Defense Ministry Releases Defense Report for Twenty-first Century," *Chosun Ilbo*, 10 July 1995.
27. *SIPRI Yearbook 2000*, 247.
28. Darren Lake, *Janes' Defense Weekly*, 4 July 2001, 3.
29. Vladimir Nadashkevich, "Russian Tank Battalion to Reinforce South Korean Armed Forces," *TASS*, 18 January 1996; Pyotr Yudin, "Moscow Pays Debt with Arms; Diverse Asian Supply Drill Poses Threat to U.S. Market Share," *Defense News*, 26 August-1 September 1996; Mikhail Shevtsov, "Russia, S. Korea Sign Military Cooperation Memorandum," *Tass*, 4 November 1996; and Aleksandr Sychov, "Attempts Being Made to Crowd Out Arms Makers — and Not Just from Cyprus," *Izvestia*, 10 January 1997, 3.
30. *Kyungbyang Daily*, 6 February 2001, 2.
31. *Defense White Paper 1999*, "Part 3: Status and Tasks of National Defense, Chapter 1: Mid-term Defense Program and 1999 Defense Budget" (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1999).
32. Kim Jong-Dae, "Miguksan mugidoib silt'ae" (The reality of U.S. weapons imports), paper presented at a conference celebrating the twenty-ninth anniversary of the "July 4 North-South Korea Joint Declaration," Seoul, 21 July 2001, 8.
33. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000-2001* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 203. In 2000, South Korea provided North Korea with \$113.8 million, whereas the international community offered the DPRK \$181.8 million. For more information, see the ROK's Ministry of Unification website at <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/kr/load/C34/C3470.htm> (accessed on 20 July 2001).
34. With its military R&D budget cut by 20 percent in 1998, Japan agreed to join the U.S. Navy Theater Wide (NTW) missile defense research program. See *SIPRI Yearbook 1999* (New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute/Oxford University Press, 1999), 351.
35. The text of the Joint Declaration is available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>.
36. *Gaiatsu*, literally meaning "outside pressure," refers to foreign — usually U.S. — pressure that helps Japanese politicians resolve a stalemated policy issue in a way favored by the foreign country.
37. *The ROK Defense White Paper 2000*, "Chapter 2: Security Situation in Northeast Asia" (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2001).
38. Liu Jianguyong, "New Trends in Sino-U.S.-Japan Relations," *Contemporary International Relations* 8, no. 7 (July 1998): 1-13, cited in Thomas Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (spring 1999): 62.
39. *SIPRI Yearbook 1999*, 474.
40. *Chosun Ilbo*, 3 October 2000, 4.

41. *The Military Balance 2000-2001*, 201.
42. *Hangyore Shinmun*, 7 June 2001, 1.
43. *Donga Ilbo*, 9 November 2000, 15.
44. President Bush had initially put talks with the DPRK on hold, ordering a review of U.S. policy toward Pyongyang. This action virtually scrapped whatever had been achieved in dialogue with the North under the Clinton administration. In a slight modification of his initial position, however, President Bush said in June 2001 that he was willing to negotiate with Pyongyang on a wide range of issues, including reductions in the DPRK's armed forces. Thus far Pyongyang has made it clear that it is not interested in discussing the wider agenda. *Chosun Ilbo*, 9 June 2001, 4; and Zeno Park, "North Korea Urges United States to Drop Cold War Hostility," *AFP*, 9 August 2001.
45. "N. Korea 1994 Military Spending \$2.2 Billion — Report," *Reuters North American Wire*, 22 March 1996; and "Nambukhan Kyongjesahoisang Pigyo" (Socio-economic comparison between South-North Korea), Tonggyoch'ong (Bureau of Statistics) (South Korea), 28 November 1995. Quoted from *Han'gyore Sinmun*, 29 November 1995. See, for the latest numbers, International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000-2001* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000), 202-03.
46. Stephen D. Goose, "The Comparative Military Capabilities of North Korean and South Korean Forces," in *The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change*, ed. Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1993), 37-57; Peter Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991), 153-67; Tae-Hwan Kwak, "Military Capabilities of South and North Korea: A Comparative Study," *Asian Perspective* 14, no. 1 (1990): 113-43; Thomas H. Moorer, "The Balance of Power in the Western Pacific," in *The Korean Peninsula: Prospects for Arms Reduction under Global Detente*, ed. William J. Taylor Jr., Young-Koo Cha, and John Q. Blodgett (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), 77-89; Trevor N. Dupuy, "New Perspectives on the Security of Korea," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 1, no. 2 (1989): 199-216; Young-Sun Ha, "The Korean Military Balance: Myth and Reality," in *The Future of South Korean-U.S. Security Relations*, ed. William J. Taylor Jr., Young-Koo Cha, John Q. Blodgett, and Michael Mazarr (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), 89-101; and Stephen Goose, "The Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula," in *Two Koreas — One Future?* ed. John Sullivan and Roberta Foss (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1987), 55-93.
47. Yi Young-hui, "Nambukhan chonjangnungryok pikyoyongu: hanpando p'yonghwat'odaewi kuch'ukul wihan mosaek" (Comparative study of South and North Korea's war capability: An exploration to establish a foundation for Korea peninsula's peace) in *Nambukhan Kunbigyongjaengkwa Kunch'uk* (South-North Korea's arms race and disarmament), ed. Kyungnam University, Far East Institute (Masan: Kyungnam University Press, 1992), 117-44.
48. "Hangyore Sinmun' Questions Quantity of Weapons Imported from USA," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 29 May 1995.
49. The Rumsfeld report was a major reversal of a previous study of missile threats by the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) entitled "Emerging Missile Threats to North America during the Next 15 Years." Produced in 1995, the NIE study was a consensus document about national security concerns produced by all of the U.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA and DIA. The director of the CIA chaired the group. The NIE study concluded that "no country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile threat in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states and Canada." Excerpts from the PS/NIE 95-19, November 1995, are available at www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/nie9519.htm.

50. U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula*, 2000 Report to Congress, 12 September 2000.
51. For “revolution in military affairs,” see Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” *The National Interest*, fall 1994, 30-42; Michael J. Mazarr, “The Military Technical Revolution,” in *American Defense Policy*, ed. Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Van Tassel, 7th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1997), 556-66; William Greider, *Fortress America: The American Military and the Consequences of Peace* (New York: Public Affairs, 1998); Mike Moore, “Unintended Consequences,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 56, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 58-64; and Cindy Williams, “Can We Afford a Revolution in Military Affairs?” *Breakthroughs*, spring 1999, 3-8. For counterproliferation, see Martin Butcher, “A Summary of Elements concerning Nuclear Weapons in the Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Security and Health, 2001); and Security and South Asia Program, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), “Nuclear Weapons in Counterproliferation: Responding to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat” (Washington, D.C.: PSR, 2001).
- For more on this new type of nuclear weapon, see Secretary of Defense, *Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets*, July 2001. For a new nuclear strategy, see William M. Arkin, “Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable,” *Los Angeles Times*, 10 March 2002: www.latimes.com/news/print-edition/sunopinion/la-000017612mar10.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Dsunop%2Dmanual; and Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Nuclear Plan Sees New Weapons and New Targets,” *New York Times*, 10 March 2002.
52. The Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review lists the DPRK as a potential target for America’s nuclear weapons, and the U.S. military has conducted exercises simulating a nuclear attack on the DPRK. The DPRK has in response insisted that it has the right to “possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing nuclear threat by the United States.” See, for example, Hans M. Kristensen, “Preemptive Posturing,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 58, no. 5 (September/October 2002): 54-59; and Charles Whelan, “North Korea Demands Non-Aggression Pact with US, Then Nuke Talks,” *AFP*, 25 October 2002.
53. For a different vision that is based on equity and reassurance, rather than on dominance and deterrence, see John D. Steinbruner, *Principles of Global Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
54. According to the Agreed Framework, the DPRK is obligated to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections after the completion of major parts of the nuclear reactors but before the delivery of key components. Given that the light-water reactors won’t be anywhere near completion for the next few years, Washington has little justification for demanding an immediate inspection. But it used IAEA’s experience with South Africa as an excuse: it had taken several years for IAEA to complete its inspections in South Africa. If IAEA begins inspections in the DPRK now, it will complete its work before the key components of the reactors are delivered. This was an argument promoted in 2002 by John Bolton, assistant secretary for nonproliferation, and Henry Sokolski who runs the Nonproliferation Institute. Realizing how untenable this argument was, the Bush administration recently replaced it with the Kelly argument that DPRK officials acknowledged that they already had a nuclear weapons program. Kelly’s position seems to hinge on a particular, very likely wrong, interpretation of a Korean phrase “kajige doiotta.” A statement from the DPRK Foreign Ministry made it clear that Pyongyang was merely saying that it had a right to possess nu-

clear weapons: "That was why the DPRK made itself very clear to the special envoy of the U.S. President that the DPRK was entitled to possess not only nuclear weapon[s] but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing nuclear threat by the United States." See DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement, 25 October 2002 at <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

55. Wendy R. Sherman, "Talking to the North Koreans," *The New York Times*, 7 March 2001, A19; and Michael R. Gordon, "How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles with North Korea," *The New York Times*, 6 March 2001, A1. URL: <http://campusgw.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/manntom2.cgi?section=networked&URL=gateway.html> (retrieved on 10 August 2001).
56. For an inside account of the missile negotiations, see Gary Samore, "U.S.-DPRK Missile Negotiations," *Nonproliferation Review* 9, no. 2 (2002): 16-20.
57. "U.S.-D.P.R.K. Joint Communique," U.S. Department of State, 12 October 2000.
58. The 2000 ROK Defense White Paper states that 55 percent of North Korean military force is deployed near the DMZ. For more information regarding North Korean force deployment, see http://www.mnd.go.kr/mnden/sub_menu/w_book/2000 (accessed on 21 June 2001).
59. Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 469.
60. Selig S. Harrison, "Time to Leave Korea?" *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 2 (2001): 64.
61. Peter Hayes and Stephen Noerper, "The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance," in *Peace and Security in Northeast Asia*, ed. Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 266.
62. See, for example, Pat Norton, "Ending the Korean Armistice Agreement: The Legal Issues," The Nautilus Institute, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, Policy Forum Online, March 1997 (http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/fora/2a_armisticelegal_norton.html).
63. USIA material, "Transcript: Lord Briefing on Clinton Trip to Japan, Korea," The White House Briefing Room, 96041105.EEA, p. 9.
64. *New York Times*, 17 July 2001, A1.
65. "Putin Warns against Unilateral Use of Force in International Disputes," *AFP*, Moscow, 3 December 2002; and *AFP*/Robert J. Saiget, "China, Russia Strategic Partnership Maturing: Analysts," *AFP*, Beijing, 3 December 2002.
66. In a more ambitious proposal, Umebayashi suggests that the two Koreas and Japan establish a regional nuclear weapons-free zone, which should then be honored in a protocol by China, Russia, and the United States. Hiro Umebayashi, "A Northeast NWFZ: A Realistic and Attainable Goal," *INESAP Information Bulletin* 10 (August 1996). See also Andrew Mack, "A Northeast Asia Nuclear-Free Zone: Problems and Prospects," in *Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia*, UNIDIR /95/16 (New York: United Nations, 1995); and John E. Endicott and Alan G. Gorowitz, "Track II Cooperative Regional Security Efforts: Lessons from the Limited Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone for Northeast Asia," *Pacifica Review* 11, no. 3 (October 1999).
67. For a dialectical reading of Carr, see Vendulka Kubalkova, "The Twenty Years' Catharsis: E. H. Carr and IR," chap. 2 in *International Relations in a Constructed World*, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholus Onuf, and Paul Kowitz (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).
68. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1939, 1964), 10.

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